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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
BILS AND NOTES--TRADE ACCEPTANCEs.-Trade acceptances, each of
which contained the following clause, "the obligation of the acceptor hereof
arises out of the purchase of goods from the drawer," were transferred to
the plaintiff for a good and valuable consideration. In an action upon
these instruments the defendant pleaded fraud. Held, the clause appear-
ing on the face of each of the instruments rendered them nonnegotiable so
that the purchaser took subject to drawer's defense of fraud, by Vernon's
Ann. Civ. St. 1925, Arts. 5932-5948. Harris v. Wuensche (Tex. 1928), 7
S. W. (2d) 595.
The statutory reference in the principal case is to the whole of the nego-
tiable instruments law. No specific section of the N. I. L. is cited. But
under this law it has been repeatedly held that trade acceptances are nego-
tiable. American Trust Co. v. McDermott (Mo. A., 1923), 256 S. W. 105;
Federal Commercial and Savings Bank v. International Clay Machinery
Co. (1925), 230 Mich. 33, 203 N. W. 166, 43 A. L. R. 1245; International
Finance Co. v. Northwestern Drug Co. (D. C., 1922), 282 F. 920, in which
the instrument specified that the acceptor's obligation "arises out of the
purchase of goods from the drawer." The reasons for these holdings lie
in the very existence of the N. I. L-the policy of encouraging the negotia-
bility of bills of exchange and promissory notes.
The Federal Reserve Act-Dec. 23, 1913, c. 6, Sec. 13, 38 Stat. 251, 12
U. S. C. Sec. 356 contains a provision that "--any Federal Reserve Bank
may discount notes, drafts, and bills of exchange arising out of commer-
cial transactions." The practice under this provision has been to render
bills which do not arise out of commercial transactions nonnegotiable. It
it, then, incumbent upon the Federal Reserve Bank rediscounting a bill
of exchange to determine whether or not it arose out of a commercial
transaction. The member.bank which when discounting a bill of exchange
demands a statement similar to the one found on thle trade acceptances in
the principal case is relieving the Federal Reserve Bank of the necessity
of inquiring into the origin of the bill, because it is then shown on the
face of the instrument that the obligation arose out of a commercial
transaction. According to this practice, then, the trade acceptances in the
principal case are certainly negotiable. See 12 U. S. C. Sec. 343.
In the principal case the court held the trade acceptances nonnegotiable
because it regarded them only as evidence of a debt which existed on an
open book account-assignable certainly, but not negotiable. Lane Co. v.
Crum (Tex., 1927), 291 S. W. 1084, which was cited by the court as being
in accord with its decision is in fact distinguishable from it in that there
was a clause in the acceptances there involved, as follows: "Maturity be-
ing in conformity with the original terms of the purchase." "This clause,"
said the court in that case, "is more than a mere 'statement of the trans-
action which gives rise to the instrument,' as permitted by Par. 2, See. 3,
Art. 5932, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 1925 (Sec. 3, Subsec. 2, N. I. L.). So far
from being a mere descriptive reference to the transaction which gave rise
to the instrument, the clause, in definite terms, points to that transaction
as the source of the acceptor's obligation to pay the amount named in the
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instrument." However, it seems that the clause in the trade acceptances
in the principal case does nothing more than give a "statement of the
transaction which gives rise to the instrument." Liability here is on the
instrument itself; the instrument needs no support from the transaction,
as in the other case, where the very maturity of the instrument depended
upon the "terms of the purchase."
In Trader's Securities Co. v. Green (Tex., 1927), 4 S. W. (2d) 182, over-
ruled in the principal case, a trade acceptance containing a clause identical
with the one found in the trade acceptance in principal case, was held to
be a negotiable instrument and the holder was held entitled to recover as a
holder in due course, under Art. 5935, Rev. Civ. Stat. Tex. 1925 (section
52, N. I. L.) to which the court made reference. The principal case seems
to stand alone in holding that a trade acceptance is not a negotiable
instrument. S. H., '30.
CONFLICT OF LAw-LAw GOVERNING THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRE-
TATION OF CONTRACTs.-The defendant railroad and another, later bankrupt,
entered into a joint contract for the purchase of coal. Their common pur-
chasing agent located at St. Louis, Missouri, sent the purchase contract,
unsigned, to the plaintiff coal company in Illinois for execution on the lat-
ter's part, and requested that the contract be returned to St. Louis "for
final handling" and execution. In Missouri joint contracts are treated as
joint and several; in Illinois the common law rule prevails. Suit was
brought against the defendant alone. Held, that the law of the place where
the contract is made governs its construction, "absent proof of a contrary
intention of the parties," and that, since a contract is made where the last
act is done towards its completion, Missouri law governs the situation, and
the defendant railroad is liable. Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & 0. R. Co.
(Mo., 1928), 8 S. W. (2d) 834.
The case is the most recent pronouncement of the Missouri Supreme
Court on the problem of what law should govern the obligations under con-
tracts made in one state, performable in another. The decision reaffirms
the position of other recent Missouri cases, treated hereinafter. There is
considerable conflict as to what law should govern contracts made in one
state to be performed in another. Three views are prominent: (1) The
view that the law of place of contracting (lex celebrationis) should govern;
(2) the view that the law of the place of performance (lex solutionis)
should govern; and (3) the view that the law of the place intended by the
parties (the autonomy doctrine) should govern.
The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws by the American Law Institute
takes the first view, that is, that the law of the place of making the con-
tract should govern. The great advantage of this rule is the convenience
of application and facility with which lawyers may advise clients. The
case under consideration quotes from Sections 333 and 335 of the Restate-
ment. The former declares that a contract is made in the state where the
last act is done towards its completion. Section 335, briefly, declares that
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